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Emerging Powers and Africa
Spurred on by the global financial crisis, leading emerging states such as China have taken an increasingly commanding role in global economic affairs in response 
to the trauma experienced by Western industrialised states. 
Nowhere is this trend more evident than in Africa, a continent 
traditionally regarded as sitting on the margins of the 
international political economy by the industrialised North. Over 
the last fifteen years, emerging powers have made significant 
inroads into Western political and economic dominance in 
Africa. The result is a diversification of external actors involved across a range of sectors of 
the African economy with much of this interaction being framed in terms of new forms of 
multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Driven by a need for resources and markets, these 
emerging powers nonetheless are acutely conscious of their own development challenges and, 
correspondingly, those facing Africa. Each reconciles changing global status and economic 
interests in Africa with their putative normative commitments to South development using 
differing modes of engagement with the continent. The changing dynamics of Africa’s 
international politics in relation to three of the leading emerging powers, namely China, 
India and Brazil, have enormous implications for Africa and its development aspirations. 
‘Emerging powers’ is a phrase coined to describe a new group of states which has through a 
combination of economic prowess, diplomatic acumen and military might managed to move 
away from developing country status to challenge the dominance of traditional mainly Western 
powers. China, India and Brazil have at various times openly declared their economic interests in 
gaining access to African resources and (to a lesser degree) markets; all have used a combination of 
public and private sector means to achieve these aims. At the same time, as developing countries 
themselves, all three have felt compelled to use at least the rhetoric of South solidarity – and 
arguably its substance – in justifying their accelerating economic presence in Africa. Although these 
emerging powers have provided longstanding (if relatively small) development assistance to Africa 
over the years, they have so far shunned some key features of OECD official overseas development 
practices in applying what they prefer to characterise as forms of South-South cooperation. 
What is the relationship between particular emerging powers and African states? How 
do emerging powers explain their relationship with Africa? How do they balance foreign 
policy concerns and economic interests in their Africa policy? How do these emerging 
powers manage activities of their national economic actors operating in Africa? The 
evolving nature of relations between emerging powers and Africa has thrown up both 
the difference and similarities experienced by these powers and African states, as well 
as the challenges and risks that differing approaches hold for African development. 
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CHINA’S DUALIST APPROACH
China’s role in Africa has received considerable attention in recent 
years. Since the onset of the domestic reform process starting 
in 1978, Maoist faith and revolutionary altruism have given way 
to the consciously self-interested commercial entrepreneurs and 
advocates of forms of market capitalism. As Africa’s second most 
significant trading partner in aggregate terms and provider of large 
loan packages in exchange for provisions for infrastructure, as well 
as an increasingly important investor in financial services, China is 
easily the largest of the emerging powers operating in Africa today.
China’s declared position is that its ties with Africa are based on explicit 
declarations of historic connectivity, political equality, respect for 
sovereignty, non-intervention and in economic matters, mutual benefit. 
China frames the relationship in the form of a multilateral diplomatic 
initiative, the tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
while the details of its implementation are overwhelmingly bilateral 
arrangements. Negotiated loans, grants and investments have allowed 
African governments a role in setting the agenda for the relationship, 
for example in prioritising particular sectors or projects. Beijing likes 
to point to the constancy of Chinese solidarity with African interests, 
especially during the anti-colonial struggle, as well as their shared 
history as victims of imperialism as producing the requisite conditions 
for a common outlook. A pre-colonial episode, the voyages of Ming 
dynasty Admiral Zheng He to Africa in the early 15th century, has been 
retrieved to underscore China’s benign intentions towards the continent. 
Given the diplomatic imperative of countering Taiwan’s drive – 
now muted under the current Guomindang government – for 
official recognition in Africa from the 1950s onwards, the Chinese 
government has had to ensure that it has a continent-wide approach 
to Africa. At the same time, the bulk of China’s economic interests 
are focussed in the leading African resource economies, namely 
Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, and Republic of Congo, as well as the 
more diversified South African economy. Beijing’s dualist approach – 
multilateral through FOCAC and bilateral in terms of implementation 
of specific forms of cooperation and investment – is tailored to 
provide a means of addressing both sets of concern for China. 
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There is a belated recognition by Chinese officials that not all Chinese economic actors 
have been operating in ways that promote mutual benefit for China and Africa. Official 
admonishments to abide by local government laws and regulations, combined with an effort 
to introduce aspects of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda into the conduct of 
leading State Owned Enterprise (SOE) and major Chinese corporations are seen to be sufficient 
palliatives. With regard to smaller private Chinese firms, however, the ability of Beijing to control 
their actions is relatively limited as these operate in Africa without utilising the conventional 
sources of finance and consciously seek to act outside of the reach of the Chinese state. 
Nonetheless, the weakness of some African states’ ability to enforce their own regulations 
is in many ways a fundamental problem in this area. This has not stopped the local media 
from trenchantly criticising the conduct of some Chinese firms. A growing dilemma for the 
Chinese government is how to protect and preserve its established economic interests without 
being seen to violate sacred foreign policy principles such as non-interference. One response 
has been to distinguish between intervention legitimated through multilateral institutions such 
as the United Nations with the concurrence of African governments, from those actions that 
lack these elements. Finally the role of unlimited Chinese migration to Africa, though small 
compared to migration to other parts of the world, nonetheless has aroused concern in 
some African communities and casts a shadow over local perceptions of Chinese intentions.
INDIA – LEGACIES OF DECOLONISATION
India’s position in Africa has some of the deepest historical and social roots of the three emerging 
powers. Though trade ties with the sub-continent formed part of an extensive commercial 
network across the Indian Ocean from the 9th century onwards, India’s contemporary relationship 
with eastern and southern Africa is rooted in the history of British colonialism and the resultant 
migration of Indians to the continent. This legacy has shaped ties between the two regions, 
fostering concurrently strong social links between communities; however, these ties have been off-
set by limited trade ties as well as episodes of antagonism and neglect in Indian-African relations.
India’s relationship to Africa is cast in terms which emphasise the political affinity between the 
sub-continent as one of the first decolonised countries in the post WWII era and the parallel 
nationalistic aspirations of Africa, as well as their common development status. Like China, India 
supports non-interference into state sovereignty and emphasises South-South cooperation, 
but its status as a thriving democracy makes it more sympathetic to the developmental and 
governance dilemmas facing equivalent states. India provided crucial diplomatic support and 
solidarity in the United Nations to emerging African nations, although it stopped short of 
supplying arms for anti-colonial and liberation movements. Technical and modest development 
assistance was established in the early 1970s. What has set India apart from the other emerging 
powers is the historical presence of a substantial Indian community in parts of the continent. 
Indentured Indian labourers were brought to the Natal colony in the mid 19th century to work 
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on sugar plantations while newly occupied 
British East Africa hired Indians to build the 
railroads. Merchants followed in their wake, 
establishing a pattern of migration to Africa 
which has fostered trade and investment 
between India and parts of Africa for 
generations, albeit at a fairly modest level. 
Indian foreign and economic policy tended to 
neglect Africa during the 1980s and only as 
its own domestic economy began to take off 
in the early 1990s did Delhi start to seek out 
commercial opportunities in the continent. 
While India’s economic interests in Africa have 
been focused on Eastern and Southern Africa, 
in 2007 these primarily private commercial 
concerns received a significant boost from state 
support. A government-launched multilateral 
forum, the India Africa Summit involving 15 
African countries and Delhi, committed itself 
to raising its credit line for Indian businesses to 
US$5.4 billion, to providing US$500 million in 
grants for development cooperation, improved 
market access to African exports, training 
for over 1500 Africans in Indian universities 
and improvements in defence cooperation. 
The IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) forum 
launched in 2003 builds on long-standing 
close ties with South Africa and in recent years 
Delhi has hoped to enlist African support for 
its positions in the WTO and in the reform 
of the United Nations Security Council. The 
presence of the Indian communities scattered 
on the African littoral once caused Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi to remark that they 
were ‘India’s ambassadors’ to Africa; this 
attitude dominated traditional official thinking 
in Delhi. Yet repeated manifestations of ‘anti-
Asian’ sentiment – for example, Idi Amin’s 
expulsion of Ugandan Asians in the early 1970s 
– have confronted the Indian government 
with the challenge of how to reconcile 
providing at least diplomatic support for these 
long-established settlement and associated 
interests, and Delhi’s more contemporary 
set of commercial interests in Africa. 
Unlike China, whose entry into Africa was 
marked with much fanfare and led by its state-
owned enterprises, the Indian presence on the 
continent has always been led by entrepreneurs 
and private business interests. Private firms 
have raised capital to open businesses in 
Eastern and Southern Africa, with two way 
trade to the East African community reaching 
US$1,343 million in 2007 while India-South 
African trade was worth US$6 billion in 
2007. Indian firms such as Tata and Vendata 
mining, and a range of pharmaceuticals, are 
driving the large investments and capturing 
market share in traditional East and Southern 
African regions as well as new markets in 
West Africa as well. This emphasis on private 
business recently altered when India’s state-
led Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) 
launched a series of bids to take up a place 
in the African energy sector. While there were 
examples of cooperation between India and 
Chinese state owned enterprises such as in 
Sudan, competition with China brought about 
a new public-private bidding process, with 
ONGC joining together with Mittal Steel to 
produce a comprehensive bid for a lease in 
Nigeria in 2006. Geo-strategic concerns are 
also influencing Indian actions. For instance, 
the Indian navy has become more active in 
the northern Indian Ocean – going so far as to 
attack Somali pirate activity – and it has sought 
to use IBSA to develop joint navel operations 
with its partners in the Indian Ocean.
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BRAZIL – REDISCOVERING ITS ‘ATLANTIC VOCATION’
Of the three emerging powers discussed here, Brazil is the least 
involved in Africa. This is paradoxical because Brazil’s historical origins 
owes much to Africa, due to the role of the Atlantic slave trade and its 
part in the wider commercial network of the Portuguese empire. Until 
fairly recently, Brazilian foreign and economic policy’s historical focus 
on North America, Europe and South America has relegated ties with 
Africa to the margins. The principle consequence of this lack of active 
engagement in Africa is that Brazil has lagged behind China and India 
in formulating and implementing a comprehensive Africa policy. Thus 
although it is in the process of expanding its commercial and financial 
ties, Brazil’s trade with Africa remains relatively low and focused on only 
a few countries, whilst at the very same time that Brasilia has actively 
sought to elevate and integrate Africa into its global foreign policy. 
The evolution of Brazilian foreign policy over the last sixty years has 
produced differing policy approaches to Africa. There is a continuum 
of Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa in the commitment to respect 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Underlying 
Brazil’s Africa policy is a desire to prioritise Brazilian developmental and 
commercial aims in approaching the continent while at the same time 
responding to broader foreign policy ambitions. In the period between 
1945 and 1974, this manifested itself as a policy of general (though 
not uniform) diplomatic support for French and Portuguese positions in 
Africa in settings such as the United Nations. This approach was guided 
in part by mercantilist needs of securing European investment in the 
Brazil economy as well as accessing its markets, and culminated in 
particularly close ties with Portuguese territories as well as strong trade 
ties with apartheid South Africa. With the collapse of the Portuguese 
empire in the mid 1970s, Brazilian foreign policy reached out to the 
rest of Africa diplomatically but essentially remained confined in 
economic terms to Lusophone Africa, Nigeria and South Africa. The 
contemporary government of Lula da Silva, has actively reversed 
the decline in ties under his predecessor, and emphasises Brazil and 
Africa’s shared historical standing as developing countries. The Lula 
government has also stressed the cultural affinities of Brazilian society 
with Africa, built on the shared experiences with Lusophone Africa 
and the influence of Brazilians of African origin. It is notable that Lula 
has traveled to Africa more than seven times in five years in office.
17
A key aim of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula da Silva has 
been to ‘reduce Brazilian vulnerability on the international 
stage’ by engaging in a more ‘muscular foreign policy’ 
to pursue its interests. With respect to Africa, this has 
meant that Brazilian foreign policy has rediscovered its 
‘Atlantic vocation’, framing it within this broader concern 
of responding more effectively to globalisation. Brazil’s 
Africa policy reflects this impulse in that the most significant 
diplomatic initiatives that involve Africa are multi-lateral 
while the substance of economic activity is played out at 
the bilateral level. A key initiative is the IBSA (India, Brazil, 
South Africa) initiative, a diplomatic partnership initially 
focused on mutual support for a position in a reformed 
United Nations Security Council. This multilateral approach 
has been expanded into other areas: the Community of 
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) has become another 
global diplomatic vehicle for extending Brazilian influence 
across Lusophone Africa. Private Brazilian commercial 
interests are active primarily in Angola, Mozambique and 
South Africa; Brazilian multinationals have also made 
a concerted effort to break into areas such as Gabon 
and Nigeria. In Angola, for instance, Brazil’s two-way 
trade has jumped to over US$1 billion in 2007 and the 
country is the leading destination for Brazilian investment 
in Africa, receiving US$750 million in 2006 alone.
The commercial focus of Brazilian enterprises, mostly 
through the activity of large private firms such as Vale 
and Odebrechts, initially entered the African market 
without significant Brazilian government support. The 
Brazilian mining giant, Vale, convinced President Lula 
to lobby the president of Gabon directly to support its 
iron ore lease, citing the Chinese approach of linking 
state diplomacy with commercial interests; thus a new 
form of direct political engagement to Brazil’s approach 
to Africa has emerged. Moreover, state firms such as 
Petrobas are embarking on joint ventures in Africa, with 
Petrobas and Angola’s state owned oil company Sonangol 
exploring training and cooperation in exploration of oil. 
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CONCLUSION
In many ways, China is the emerging power which makes the most extravagant claims to 
formulating a relationship that is strategic in its aims, equitable in its political engagement and 
founded on the notion of a common conception of political history. Beijing has also constructed 
the most comprehensive approach to the continent, again in part reflecting the diplomatic 
imperatives of competition with Taiwan, as well as the resource needs of sustaining China’s 
own economic growth and associated domestic political stability. China’s profile in Africa has 
come at a cost however, as it has had greater exposure to risk across the continent and had 
to bear more international criticism than either India or Brazil (although their policies and the 
behavior of their economic actors may be equally open to criticism). Some African and Western 
liberal critics point to the manner in which China’s trade with Africa replicates features of 
traditional Western colonial trade for African resources in exchange for manufactured goods. 
China adamantly claims that this economic asymmetry does not alter the overall positive and 
equitable framework of China-Africa relations. This evocation of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ – 
that Chinese supposedly unique approach to Africa ensures that the relationship will remain 
equitable and non-exploitative – remains controversial. It must counter the misperceptions 
within African societies and local rival businesses of Chinese commercial and foreign policy 
aims; this places a greater burden ‘of proof’ on the Chinese in a way that neither India nor Brazil, 
with their more narrow approaches to the continent, face in pursuing their economic interests. 
Despite its longstanding political and socio-economic engagement and socio-economic 
terms, India’s contemporary active drive for engagement in Africa is relatively new. It is 
clearly being influenced by China in developing the multilateral forum and even in the 
modes of financial initiatives and commercial deals. However, there is little evidence that 
Delhi aspires to play the Chinese continental-wide role. The role of local communities of 
Indian origin, which maintain links to the sub-continent, remains a problem and Delhi 
vacillates as to how much to emphasise these ties in shaping its overall Africa policy.
In the case of Brazil, despite the pressure to increase Brazilian involvement in Africa, much of 
what has been done still reflects Brasilia’s primary concern for integrating its Africa policy in the 
service of broader foreign policy aims. Whereas in the past this produced an orientation which saw 
more developmental and political benefits accruing by engaging with the industrialised countries 
of the North (to the detriment of Africa), under President Lula the shift towards enhancing 
South-South economic and diplomatic cooperation is linked to Brazil’s larger international 
ambitions and fears of globalisation. Concurrently, the focus on Lusophone Africa, where Brazil 
arguably has an advantage over other external actors, ensures a neat juxtaposition between 
the cultural-historical dimensions of Brazil’s Africa policy and its current commercial interests. 
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As the leading emerging power in Africa, China seems to be setting the 
pace and example for India and Brazil which to varying degrees have 
adopted elements of the Chinese approach to Africa. Even Western 
states and companies are reviewing their approach, witnessed by the 
changes at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007 and the call in the 
United States for a more high profile presidential engagement in Africa 
policy. There are signs that the newly acquired economic prowess of 
emerging powers and its accompanying political dimensions may result 
in a kind of proxy conflict in Africa, echoing the European conflicts of 
19th and 20th century; for example, the stiff competition between 
Chinese and Indian companies for commercial rights to oil in Sudan 
and Angola. This might suggest that Western interests, be they 
commercial or normative, are in the decline in Africa; but the selective 
engagement of the United States and the residual presence of European 
interests will remain a feature of external relations for African states. 
 
It is ironic that China, in particular, has taken advantage of economic 
liberalisation in Africa associated with Western structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, rather than Western financial and 
commercial interests. The relative flexibility and lack of conditionalities, 
speed of decision making, and less-risk adverse approach of Chinese 
investment corresponds more closely with African identification of local 
developmental needs. China’s greater willingness to work with existing 
imperfect institutions may result in the reinforcement of African elites: 
looked at another way, we may be seeing the emergence of alternative 
state structures based on a loose Chinese model of development, 
and an alternative state discourse that shifts away from the primacy 
of democratisation to promote economic growth and development. 
Thus, the emerging powers are set to shape the economic and 
perhaps even the political fortunes of Africa in the 21st century.
 
 
